HUMBUGGING THE HISTORIAN:
A Reappraisal of Longstreet at Gettysburg

No single event in Civil War history has generated more partisan commentary than the behavior of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863. A prominent figure in the ranks of Longstreet's detractors is Robert K. Krick, Chief Historian of the Fredericksburg-Spotsylvania National Battlefield Park. In a recent article, Mr. Krick is critical of Longstreet's attitude and demeanor at Gettysburg: an attitude and demeanor that Mr. Krick believes contributed to Confederate defeat in that battle. (1) Mr. Krick bolsters his case by "recounting a few bits of Longstreet perfidy which are not so much mooted about as the Gettysburg business" to support circumstantially his attack on Longstreet and also demonstrate (as Mr. Krick puts it) Longstreet's "credentials as a narrator and purveyor of historical truth." (2)

The bit of "Longstreet perfidy" to be examined below recounts Mr. Krick's view of Longstreet's role at the Battle of Second Manassas. In discussing Longstreet's role at Second Manassas, Mr. Krick accuses him of claiming credit for the performance of Lt. Col. Stephen D. Lee's artillery battalion, a unit whose activities "had nothing whatsoever to do with orders from Longstreet," and exaggerating the role of "one of his batteries (Chapman's Dixie Artillery) into a battle-saving maneuver. (3) As Lee's battalion was part of Longstreet's corps during the Second Manassas Campaign, the activities of that unit certainly had something to do with Longstreet's orders. (4) Just how much Longstreet's orders had to do with the activities of Lee's command will be seen shortly.

On August 29, 1862, Longstreet personally selected a position on the extreme left of his line for the Washington Artillery to occupy. (5) From this position the Washington Artillery could support either Jackson's or Longstreet's troops to the left and right of the Washington Artillery respectively. The following day Longstreet replaced the Washington Artillery with Colonel Lee's Battalion and sent the Washington Artillery into reserve. Lee remained in position all day. Late in the afternoon, the Federal Firth Corps, under Maj. Gen. Fitz-John Porter, launched a heavy attack on Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's position. (6)

When Porter launched his attack, Lee opened an enfilade fire on Porter's left flank causing considerable damage to the attacking Federals. Fearing Jackson's line would break, Gen. Robert E. Lee ordered Longstreet to support Jackson with infantry. What happened next is described by Jennings C. Wise in The Long Arm of Lee:

It was now that, instead of sending Jackson a reinforcement of infantry as called for, Longstreet ordered Bachman's and Reilly's batteries of Frobel's Battalion over from the hill in front of the Groveton House, where they had been engaged with the federal guns in the Douglas House orchard, to the right of S. D. Lee's group, from which advanced point they opened a raking fire with terrific effect into the left rear of Porter's column. These two batteries added all that was needed to put an end to the attack. (7)

It is worth noting that Longstreet's account of this action is substantially the same as the account given by Wise. (8) Mr. Krick states in his article that Longstreet actions at Second Manassas can be charitably explained by ignorance on his part: "that Longstreet simply did not know what was going on where the action was decided, a mile to his left."(9) This explanation is unsupported by the facts available. Longstreet not only knew exactly what was going on to his left, he took prompt and effective steps to render the immediate assistance possible to Jackson's hard-pressed troops. Still less accurate is Krick's concluding comment that to Longstreet "the truth [about Longstreet's conduct] is probably less favorable, though, than would warrant a verdict of simple ignorance.." (10) If anything, an objective review of Longstreet's conduct on August 30, 1862, merits praise and respect. Even Douglas Southall Freeman had nothing but praise for the manner in which Longstreet dealt with the Federal attack. (11)

Although primarily dealing with Longstreet's attitude and performance on July 2, 1863, Mr. Krick is also critical of Longstreet's proposal to move around the left flank of the Union army, terming it "unthinkable" and suggesting the proposal "reeked of Beauregard at his most visionary, which is very bad indeed." (12) Mr. Krick then proceeds to display one of the hoariest chestnuts in the Gettysburg controversy, namely "Longstreet convinced himself that some time in June, Lee had promised not to fight an offensive battle in Northern territory." (13)

With respect to Longstreet's flanking proposal, no definite answer regarding its practicality is, or ever will be, possible, nor is this the place to rake over the dead coals that subject. Glen Tucker ably states the case for Longstreet, and Douglas Southall Freeman states the case against him. Those wishing to examine the evidence presented by Messrs. Tucker and Freeman both for and against Longstreet may do so at their leisure. (14)

With respect to the assertion Longstreet convinced himself Lee promised not to fight an offensive battle in the North, a definite answer is possible. Longstreet made no such assertion.

One of the objectives of Lee's move north can be found in his report in the Official Records and the postwar writings of two members of his staff, Charles Marshall and Walter Taylor. According to Colonel Taylor, Lee went north "to transfer the theater of war to Northern soil, and by selecting a favorable time and place in which to receive the attack his adversary would be compelled to make upon him; to take the reasonable chances of defeating him in a pitched battle." (15) Lee's report and the account by Charles Marshall are in accord with Taylor's statement. (16) Longstreet's accounts also agree that a defensive battle was one of the objectives of Lee's move north. Nowhere in his writings does Longstreet assert that Lee promised not to fight an offensive battle (or the converse, to fight only a defensive one). What Longstreet does say (and the accounts by Lee, Taylor, and Marshall support this) is Lee agreed that one of his objectives in going north would be to "work so as to force the enemy to attack us." (17)

Turning to Longstreet on July 2, Mr. Krick asserts that Lee did not have "the willing cooperation" of Longstreet during that day's operation. The opening salvo concerns Longstreet's alleged "refusal to begin his march toward his assigned sector" until Evander M. Law's brigade (one-eighth of Longstreet's striking force, be it noted) arrived on the scene. "Awaiting the single brigade before attacking might be at least arguably sound judgment (albeit weakly so). To sit and await its arrival to start the march was idiotic, or more accurately, obstructionist." (18) This is by far the weakest of Mr. Krick's criticisms. Longstreet waited for Law because he asked and received Lee's permission to do so. Longstreet's conduct cannot be characterized as obstructionist, since it was sanctioned by Lee after a proper request was made. (19) It is scarcely idiotic for the commander of an attacking force to want to have his troops concentrated, prior to beginning a march to positions from which an attack is to be launched, particularly when the delay (in this case some thirty or forty minutes) is minimal. (20)

Before considering Mr. Krick's criticisms of Longstreet's actions on July 2, some background to set the stage is necessary. Lee decided on the evening of July 1, to attack the Federal army on the following day, despite Longstreet's advice to the contrary. Once Lee made his decision, Longstreet dispatched couriers to Maj. Gens. John B. Hood and Lafayette McLaws to have their division on hand as soon as possible. Aside from Lee's statement of intent, there was no definite decision when or where the attack was to be made. Longstreet reported to Lee's headquarters in the early morning of July 2, having already ordered his divisions to come up as soon as possible. Prior to Longstreet's arrival, Lee ordered Capt. Samuel R. Johnston, an engineer on his staff, to scout the Federal left.

Following Johnston's departure, Lee began a lengthy conference with his commanders about which little is definitely known, but much is speculated. The participants included, at various times, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Hood and McLaws, the latter two being directed to report to Lee upon their arrival at Seminary Ridge with their troops. The course of the conference prior to Captain Johnston's arrival is difficult to reconstruct. Apparently, Lee decided to attack the Federal left and launch a demonstration at the Federal right "to be converted into a real attack should the opportunity offer."(21) At this conference, Longstreet took the opportunity to argue against an attack and again advanced his proposal for a general flanking movement around the Federal left only to be overruled by Lee. A. P. Hill joined the conference and Hood came up between 7:00-7:30 a.m. while the discussion concerning an attack on the Federal left was in progress. Hood left the conference and rejoined his division shortly before Johnston's return. (22)

Captain Johnston, having completed his scouting mission, rejoined Lee between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. Johnston reported that, although he was unable to scout the southern end of Cemetery Ridge, he was able to reach the summit of Little Round Top. He then scouted south beyond Big Round Top before rejoining Lee. Johnston reported there were no Federal troops in the area he scouted and finished his report shortly before the arrival of McLaws. (23)

Hood appears to have left the conference prior to Captain Johnston's arrival. After Johnston finished his report, Hill received orders from Lee instructing him to have Richard Anderson's division support Longstreet's attack against the Federal left. Hill left to inform Anderson of his part in the coming attack. (24)

McLaws, the last of the commanders to arrive, reported to Lee shortly after Johnston's arrival. McLaws found Lee sitting on a log with a map of the Gettysburg area beside him and Longstreet nearby, irritably pacing back and forth. After greeting McLaws, Lee began to discuss the coming assault and the part McLaws' division would play in it. Specifically, Lee wanted to know if McLaws could march his force south and position it perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road so as to envelop the Federal left flank. The movement, Lee emphasized, must be made along a route that would enable the troops to reach their positions unseen by the Federals. (25) McLaws replied, "I do not know if there is anything to prevent it, but I can reconnoiter and see." (26) Lee informed McLaws of Captain Johnston's reconnaissance at this point. McLaws evidently misunderstood Lee and, thinking that Johnston was about to leave on his mission, requested permission to accompany him. Longstreet broke into the conversation at this point and instructed McLaws to remain with is division. (27)

Longstreet then directed McLaws to form his division parallel to the Emmitsburg Road upon arriving on the Federal left, but was immediately overruled by Lee who repeated his previous order for McLaws to form his command perpendicular to the road. McLaws then placed his division under cover and awaited Longstreet's order to begin the flank march.

The attack plan for Longstreet and Anderson was now clear. Lee's plan called for extending the Confederate right across the Emmitsburg Road to launch an "oblique assault north of the two Round Tops," to "get astride Cemetery Ridge at its lowest point" and roll up the Federal left. (28) McLaws division was to form its assault line north of Little Round Top and on a line perpendicular to and east of the Emmitsburg Road. (29) Anderson's division was to form on Seminary Ridge with its right flank brigade on Hood's left. Hood's division was to be placed between the divisions of Anderson and McLaws. Up to this point, Lee issued no orders for Longstreet's march to begin. Having finalized his plans for the assault on the Federal left, Lee rode over to Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's headquarters on the Confederate left. Ewell was ordered to demonstrate against the Federal right when he heard Longstreet's guns and, if the opportunity presented itself, convert his demonstration into a full attack. Lee returned to Longstreet's position somewhat somewhat after 11:00 a.m., and ordered Longstreet to begin his movement against the Federal left. (30) As previously noted, Longstreet requested and received Lee's permission to await the arrival of Law's brigade. Shortly after the arrival of Laws brigade, Longstreet's corps, with McLaws' division in the lead, began to move.

The march of Longstreet's corps to the Federal left provides Mr. Krick with ammunition for his next volley at Longstreet. Characterizing his movement as a "long, confused, slow march," Longstreet is also taken to task for using Captain Johnston as "convenient foil" to justify his sulking and refusal "to have anything to do with guiding" the march of his corps. The result of Longstreet's actions in refusing to assist Captain Johnston who, according to Mr. Krick, "was innocently sent [by Lee] to be of help," was a fouled-up march of cosmic proportions. However, the facts do not support this conclusion." (31)

There is no question Longstreet's march started off on the wrong foot. The initial route taken would have revealed the Confederate column to Federal observers on Little Round Top when the column reached a point somewhat south of Black Horse Tavern. In order to keep the column concealed, a counter march was necessary and as a result Longstreet's attack did not begin until about 4:00 p.m. The two questions to be considered are: what role did Longstreet have in selecting the route by which his troops advanced; and did his attitude adversely affect the manner in which Lee's orders were carried out?

Longstreet insisted throughout his postwar career that he was not responsible for the selection of the route over which his troops marched. "General Lee ordered Colonel Johnston, of his engineer corps, to lead and conduct the head of the column. My troops, therefore, moved forward under the guidance of a special officer of General Lee, and with instructions to follow his directions." (32) Not surprisingly, Johnston's account is at odds with Longstreet's. According to Johnston: "The corps was not put under my charge to be taken where I saw fit, for certainly I had not received any instructions from either Genl Lee or Genl Longstreet as to where the latter was to go. I was ordered by Genl Lee to 'ride with Genl Longstreet,' this is all the instructions that I received." (33) Johnston could only speculate on what his role in accompanying Longstreet was to be, in an 1878 letter to Fitzhugh Lee, but in a subsequent letter to General McLaws in 1892 hi was very clear about his role. "The General [Lee] said that he wanted me to join General Longstreet. No other instructions whatever were given me. I fully understood that to mean that I was to go with General Longstreet to aid him in any way that I could." (34) It is not believable that an officer (particularly one who performed the only reconnaissance of the Federal left earlier in the day) would be detached to Longstreet without more specific instructions.

General McLaws, who was the only one of Longstreet's division commanders to comment on the events of the march in any detail, flatly contradicts Johnston's account. In an address delivered before the Confederate Veterans Association of Savannah, Georgia, McLaws remarked that Johnston's memory failed him with respect to his duties on July 2 "for he seems to have forgotten that he was the guide conducting troops over ground, he alone of all of them had reconnoitered, and that every step taken was under his direction, of course." (35) Nor is McLaws the only person who contradicts Johnston. Both E. Porter Alexander, one of Longstreet's artillery commanders, and G. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet's chief of staff, are in agreement with McLaws. (36) There can be little doubt that far from being a "convenient foil" in Longstreet's hands, Johnston, acting on orders from Lee, chose the route Longstreet's corps followed to reach the Federal left and conducted McLaws' division during its march there.

Lee's orders and plan of attack issued earlier in the morning also provide the answer to the question of why Longstreet's column was forced to countermarch near Black Horse Tavern. As previously noted, Lee's plan called for a progressive attack with McLaws' division leading the assault. Since McLaws was under Lee's orders to begin the attack on the Federal left from a position which Lee selected for him that morning, his division had to remain at the head of the column so no unnecessary time would be lost in launching the attack.

It must also be remembered that Lee gave explicit orders for McLaws' division to reach its assigned position without being seen. McLaws attributed the problems experienced on the march to these orders and also to the "delay in the reconnaissance and the faulty reconnaissance, making a change of route necessary in order to carry out Genl Lee's orders were the reasons why we were so long getting into position." (37) Considering the problems experienced by Longstreet's command on its march, it cannot be said there was undue delay on the march. (38) While it is true that Longstreet (according to Colonel Sorrel) failed to conceal his anger at Lee's orders to attack in spite of his objections, there is no evidence to support an assertion that this anger delayed or adversely affected the march of his corps.

By far the most damning charge presented by Mr. Krick is the assertion that Longstreet's tempter and sulking resulted in a willful failure on his part to avoid casualties, due to his insistence

…that Lee's order [for the oblique attack on the Federal left previously discussed] be carried out without revision. The whole battle was being mishandled anyway, by his lights, and this would show Lee the error of his ways. The division and brigade commanders remonstrated and pleaded with Longstreet. There were close enough to the unfortunate infantrymen, who would bleed and pay the price for the gesture, to be outraged. (39)

Fortunately for Longstreet's reputation, the effectiveness of Mr. Krick's prose is not matched by corresponding accuracy.

When McLaws' troops arrived opposite the Peach Orchard, about 3:30 p.m., they found it occupied by Federal troops. Unaware of this new development, Longstreet ordered McLaws to begin his attack toward Cemetery Ridge, in the mistaken belief there was no enemy between McLaws and his objective. Lee, who was with Longstreet at this time, also evidenced impatience for McLaws to begin his attack. Fortunately, before McLaws could comply, a courier arrived with orders for him to wait until Hood's division passed behind his lines and took up position to his right. (40)

Lee and Longstreet, realizing that their attack could not be executed as planned, were forced to modify it. Hood's division was ordered to take up position to the right of McLaws and attack up the Emmitsburg Road toward Cemetery Ridge. McLaws was to attack the Peach Orchard and part of Anderson's division was to protect the left flank of McLaws' division as it went forward. (41)

Before beginning his attack, General Hood requested a further modification in the new plan. Based on information received from scouts, Hood believed he could move his command around Big Round Top and assail the Federal line in the flank and rear, rolling up the Federal line and capturing the Round Tops. (42) Longstreet was unwilling to allow further modification and refused Hood's repeated requests to modify his new orders. There were good reasons for Longstreet's refusal. "It is not likely that the movement proposed by Hood would have accomplished much. Already our line was dangerously extended, and to have pushed one or two divisions past the 3d corps would have invited their destruction. (43) Porter Alexander's criticism states some, but not all, of the problems inherent in Hood's proposal. If Hood had been allowed to make the movement he proposed, it would have delayed the start of the attack past 4:00 p.m. and require new orders for Anderson and McLaws. Longstreet was unwilling to wait longer and instructed Hood to carry out his orders and begin the attack.(44)

There is no question Lee's initial orders for Longstreet's attack were substantially modified prior to the attack of Hood's division and this modification was carried out by Lee and Longstreet in consultation with each other. Equally clear is the fact that only ONE of Longstreet's commanders requested the plan of attack be changed. The picture of a sullen Longstreet coldly refusing the pleas of his commanders to modify Lee's orders is unsupported by any evidence.

If, as Mr. Krick says, Moxley Sorrel noticed Longstreet display anger and apathy, it is only fair to point out that Sorrel commented favorably on Longstreet's attitude and personal leadership once the afternoon's fighting began. (45)

Mr. Krick's heavy reliance on McLaws letter of July 7, 1863 to provide support for his unfavorable view of Longstreet ignores the more balanced and favorable accounts of Longstreet in McLaws' later writings. (46) Also ignored is the motivation behind McLaws' unfavorable comments about Longstreet in his letter. Following Lee's retreat from Gettysburg, at least two sources (Fitzgerald Ross, the Austrian military observer and "special correspondent") noted McLaws was being blamed for not attacking soon on July 2. (47) It is possible that the tone of McLaws' letter reflects not outrage at Longstreet's conduct, but a very human desire to avoid blame for the events of July 2 and sift it elsewhere.

Without doubt Longstreet made mistakes at Gettysburg: his initial insistence that McLaws attack immediately upon arriving opposite the Peach Orchard, despite the presence of Federal troops there; his reliance (and everybody else's) on information hours old to plan and launch an attack on the Federal left, and the failure of the Confederates to post scouts to observe the Federal left while Longstreet made his approach, are but a few examples. But whatever mistakes Longstreet made at Gettysburg, there were not the result of temper, sulking, or pique. (48)

Longstreet did not have his best day at Gettysburg, but his attitude and demeanor did not cost the Confederates their chance for victory on July 2. The delays encountered by Longstreet in reaching his jump-off point; the necessity of changing the plan of attack, and the corresponding delay occasioned by that change; with other factors (such as the absence of cavalry and poor to non-existent staff work) combined to deny the Confederates victory on July 2 by a slim margin. Considering the problems encountered and overcome by Longstreet and his men on July 2, Longstreet's pride in the performance of his First Corps is fully justified.

Mr. Krick's account, for from amassing "enough non-partisan evidence to arrive at a partisan conclusion," merely amounts to unsupported and undocumented character assassination. Nowhere in Mr. Krick's account is there the slightest hint there might be evidence to support few kind words on Longstreet's behalf. An objective evaluation of the available evidence compels entry of a verdict favorable to Longstreet for his performance on July 2, 1863. Truth is the proper antagonist of error.

This article was originally published in The Gettysburg Magazine, January 1, 1992 issue number 6, is reprinted with owner Andy Turner's generous permission.

NOTES

      1. Robert K. Krick, "'I Consider Him a Humbug…,': McLaws on Longstreet at Gettysburg", Virginia Country's Civil War Quarterly 5 (1986): pp. 28-30.
      2. Ibid., p. 28.
      3. Ibid.
       4. United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 volumes. In 128 parts (Washington Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), series 1, vol. 12, part 2, p. 548 (hereafter cited as O. R.).
      5. Ibid., pp. 565, 571; William M. Owen, In Camp and Battle with The Washington Artillery of New Orleans, (Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1885), p. 116. A good corrective to Mr. Krick's overly hostile account can be found in Gary W. Gallagher "Scapegoat in Victory: James Longstreet and the Battle of Second Manassas." Civil War History, 34 (December 1986); 293-307.
      6. O. R., series 1, vol. 12, part 2, pp.565-66; Owen, In Camp, p. 119.
      7. Jennings C. Wise, The Long Arm of Lee, 2 vols. (Richmond: Owens Publishing Co., 1988), vol. 1, p. 272.
      8. James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, (Millwood: Kraus Reprint Col, 1976), pp. 186-88; O. R., series 1, vol. 12, part 2, pp. 563-68.
      9. Krick, "Longstreet," p. 28.
      10. Ibid.
      11. Douglas S. Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942-1944) vol. 2, pp. 124-27.
      12. Krick, "Longstreet," p. 28.
      13. Ibid.
      14. For Freeman's views see Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, vol. 3, pp. 108-9, and Douglas S. Freeman, R. E. Lee, 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), vol. 2, pp 73-75, 81-85; For a favorable view of Longstreet's proposals see: Glen Tucker, "Longstreet: Culprit or Scapegoat?" Civil War Times, vol. 1, no. 1 (April 1962): 5-7, 39-44; See also Glenn Tucker, Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 50-70.
      15. Walter H. Taylor, General Lee, His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865 (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1975), p. 180; see also Walter H. Taylor, Four Years With General Lee (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 90.
      16. For Lee's report see O. R., series 1, vol. 27, part 2 pp. 313-25; Frederick Maurice ed., An Aide-De-Camp of Lee (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1927), pp. 193-94, shows the views of Charles Marshall.
      17. Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 331. See also James Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," Philadelphia Weekly Times, Annals of the War (Gettysburg: Civil War Times Illustrated, 1974), p. 414; and James Longstreet, "Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania." Robert Underwood Johnson, and Clarence Clough Buell (eds.) Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols.
      18. Krick, "Longstreet," p. 30.
      19. Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 365,; see also Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," p. 422.
      20. Ibid., p. 365; Also Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," p. 422.
      21. O. R., series 1, vol. 27, part 2, pp. 318-19; See also Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, vol. 2, p. 114.
      22. The best published account of Lee's conference on the morning of July 2, 1863, can be found in Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 104-114. It should be noted that the account of the conference that follows is somewhat at odds with that in Pfanz. The account of the conference in this paragraph is based on John B. Hood, Advance and Retreat (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), p. 57, in which Hood says he joined Lee, Longstreet, and A. P. Hill who were "observing the position of the Federals." McLaws joined the conference about 8:00 a.m. and does not mention Hood's presence in any of his accounts (see endnote #32). From this it is concluded that Hood (who does not note anyone's departure other than his own) left prior to Hill's departure and McLaws' arrival. For the time of McLaws arrival see Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, p. 114, fn. 34.
      23. For these events see Samuel R. Johnston, "Letter to General L. McLaws." June 27, 1892; "Letter to Reverend George Petterkin," December __, 18__; "Letter to General Fitzhugh Lee," February 16, 1878, typescript in Douglas S. Freeman Papers, Civil War Sources and Photostats, Container 173, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. In the first two letters, Lee, Longstreet and A. P. Hill are all mentioned as being present when Johnston made his report to Lee. In the final letter to Fitzhugh Lee, no generals are specifically mentioned although the clause "The Generals suspended their conversation to hear my report" contained in the letter plus the fact that the text of the letter indicates prior correspondence with Fitzhugh Lee supports the conclusion that "The Generals" referred to are those mentioned in the first two letters. It is clear from Johnston's correspondence that his report was made before the arrival of McLaws and after Hood's departure from Lee's headquarters.
      24. For the orders given to Hill, see Pfanz, Gettysburg, pp. 113-14.
      25. McLaws' accounts are found in a number of sources; See Lafayette McLaws, "The Battle of Gettysburg," in United Confederate Veterans Association of Savannah, Addresses Delivered Before the Confederate Veterans Association of Savannah, Georgia, (N.P. 1896, pp. 57-97; See especially pp. 66-69, Lafayette McLaws, "Gettysburg," Southern Historical Society Papers, 52 vols. (Richmond, Virginia: Southern Historical Society, 1878), vol. 7, pp. 64-90 (hereinafter cited as S.H.S.P.); See especially p. 68; The most detailed account is contained in Lafayette McLaws, "Longstreet at Gettysburg," Philadelphia Weekly Press (February 15, 22, and 29, 1888). It should be noted that in none of the accounts given by Johnston is McLaws noted as being present, although McLaws mentions that Lee told him Johnston was almost ready to start his scout of the Federal left upon McLaws' arrival. Reconciling McLaws and Johnston is not impossible. As Freeman in Lee's Lieutenants (vol. 3, p. 113, fn. 30) points out, McLaws is incorrect in his assertion that Lee indicated Johnston was "ready" to begin his scout shortly after McLaws arrived at Lee's headquarters. Based on Johnston's letters, it appears that Freeman too has made an error regarding Lee's comments on Johnston's activities. Based on Johnston's letters and McLaws' account, it appears that Lee's comment to McLaws that: "Captain Johnston of my staff has been ordered to reconnoiter the ground, and I expect he is about ready" (Ibid., p. 112) should be interpreted to mean not that Johnston was ready to report to Lee and the other members of the conference (his letter indicated he had already done this), but that Johnston was ready to begin to make the results of his scout known to McLaws. To accept McLaws' accounts as given would have Lee issuing McLaws' orders to attack the Federal left before Lee know the results Johnston's scout. It is far more likely that Johnston reported to Lee, Longstreet, and Hill what he saw and Lee then made his decisions to attack the Federal left; telling McLaws, upon his arrival, what was to be done and then allowing Johnston to brief McLaws on the results of the scout.
      26. McLaws, "Battle of Gettysburg," p. 69.
      27. Ibid., p. 69.
      28. Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, vol. 3 p. 114.
      29. McLaws, "Longstreet at Gettysburg," Philadelphia Weekly Press (February 15, 1888) The conclusion that McLaws was to form east of the Emmitsburg Road is supported by Hood in Advance and Retreat, p. 57, which has his division forming across the Emmitsburg Road.       30. Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, vol. 3, p. 114.
      31. Krick, "Longstreet," p. 30.
      32. Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," p. 422.
      33. Letter of S. R. Johnston to General Fitz Lee, February 11, 1878, typescript in Douglas S. Freeman Papers, Civil War Sources and Photostats III, Container 173, Library of Congress, Washington D. C.
      34. Letter of S. R. Johnston to General Lafayette McLaws, June 27, 1892, Freeman Papers, Civil War Sources and Photostats III, Container 173, Library of Congress.
      35. McLaws, "Battle of Gettysburg," p. 73.
      36. McLaws, "Longstreet at Gettysburg," Philadelphia Weekly Press (February 22, 1888), in which letters to McLaws from E. P. Alexander and G. M. Sorrel are reprinted.
      37. Letter of General Lafayette McLaws to General James Longstreet, June 12, 1873, Lafayette McLaws Papers, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. This letter makes it clear that McLaws did not believe Longstreet could have attacked earlier.
      38. Donald B. Sanger, "Was Longstreet a Scapegoat?," Infantry Journal 43 (January/February 1936): 39-45, of particular interest and pp. 41-42, wherein Sanger discusses the rate of march of Longstreet's corps.
      39. Krick, "Longstreet," p. 30.
      40. McLaws, "Battle of Gettysburg," pp. 77-78.
      41. Lee's position throughout these events is a matter of some mystery. Harry W. Pfanz, in Gettysburg, tend to support the position that Lee either made or approved the change in plans, see pp. 153-154; in William Youngblood, "Unwritten History of the Gettysburg Campaign," S.H.S.P., 38 (1910): 312-318, the author, a courier on Longstreet's staff, places Lee with Longstreet during these events and later (see p. 314). Although generally discounted, Youngblood was in a position to observe personally the events he recounts and the bulk of his recollections can be circumstantially corroborated. Without clear evidence to discredit Youngblood, there seems to be no reason to dismiss his account.
      42. Hood, Advance and Retreat, p. 56.
      43. E. P. Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate, (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1977), p. 394; See also Gary W. Gallagher, ed., Fighting for the Confederacy: the Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 237.
      44. Hood, Advance and Retreat, pp. 58-59; Evander Law made his case for a flanking move to his division commander, Hood. Hood then took the matter to Longstreet; See E. M. Law, "The Struggle for Round Top," Battles and Leaders, vol. 3, p. 318.
      45. G. Moxley Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1988) p. 168.
      46. Krick, "Longstreet," p. 30. There is no indication n the article that any sources from McLaws other than the letter of July 1863 to his wife were used.
      47. Fitzgerald Ross, Cities and Camps of the Confederate States, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), p. 56; See also Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1979) p. 768, fn. 14.
      48. Although outside the scope of this article, it bears mention that the absence of cavalry to screen and scout Longstreet's route robs Krick's attempt to contrast Longstreet's march at Gettysburg with Jackson's at Chancellorsville of validity. Krick, "Longstreet," p. 30. The presence or absence of Confederate cavalry for use in operations on July 2, cannot be attributed to any alleged sulking on Longstreet's part.